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Introduction
The normative ideal of democratic representation (e.g. Dahl 1971) suggests that as more immigrant-origin residents acquire citizenship and thus the right to vote, their interests should find more consideration in the parliamentary activities of members of parliament (MPs).
Indeed, the relevance of this ideal should not be underestimated, given that immigrants and their descendants remain socially and economically disadvantaged in most Western democracies of immigration (Alba and Foner 2015) . Consequently, political scientists are called for to examine the mechanisms underlying the substantive representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups.
Conceptually, substantive representation refers to whether MPs 'act in the interest of' citizens, while descriptive representation refers to whether MPs' sociodemographic features 'stand for' a certain group of citizens (Pitkin 1967) . Despite this conceptual differentiation, however, normative claims of a connection between the two concepts of representation (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995) has inspired the lion's share of previous research on immigrants ' substantive representation (e.g. Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014a) . Doubtlessly, this literature has advanced our understanding considerably, confirming by and large a link between the descriptive and substantive representation of immigrant-origin citizens. Nevertheless, it is no secret that immigrant-origin citizens remain descriptively underrepresented in Western European parliaments (Alba and Foner 2015; Bird et al. 2011; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013) . Therefore, this group of citizens has to rely to a considerable extent on the level of substantive representation provided by native MPs. There is, however, a dearth of research on immigrants' substantive representation unrelated to MPs' own national or ethnic backgrounds.
Consequently, rather than relying on the assumption of intrinsically motivated 'descriptive' representatives, we think in this paper of MPs as agents in a principal-agent relationship, with local voters as well as political party bodies inside and outside parliament being the most important principals (Carey 2009; Mitchell 2000; Müller 2000) . Speaking on behalf of immigrants and their descendants is understood as being part of MPs' strategies to please the demands of their principals. Yet, the incentive to please the demands of one principal at the expense of another one is a function of the institutional environment. On one hand, MPs favour the demands of a centralised party body under party-centred electoral rules, a centralised candidate selection method and due to powerful parliamentary party groups (PPGs). On the other, they are 'pulled' towards local demands by candidate-centred electoral rules and a localised candidate selection method (Carey and Shugart 1995; Gallagher 1988; Strøm 1997 ).
The question arises what happens when the incentives encoded in these institutional features conflict (Martin 2014; Preece 2014) . Do MPs remain responsive to the local demands of immigrant-origin citizens when a decentralised candidate selection method clashes with partycentred electoral rules? Do they remain responsive to the demands of the PPG leadership when electoral rules are candidate-centred? To examine these questions, we turn to a case study of MPs' legislative behaviour in the German Bundestag, a complex institutional context combining mixed electoral rules with a localised candidate selection method and tightly organised PPGs. Here, MPs are 'pulled' by their principals' demands in different directions, thus providing researchers the opportunity to better disentangle the effects of institutional variables while holding country-specific context fixed. Empirically, this study is based on a dataset of all MPs serving in the 17 th Bundestag (2009-13) , combined with a semi-automated content analysis of more than 20,000 of their parliamentary questions (PQs) for written answer.
Quantitative analyses of this dataset suggest that principals' demands are important determinants of the substantive representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups in MPs'
PQs. However, our findings provide little support that different electoral rules moderate MPs' attentiveness towards the demands of their principals. A localised candidate selection on the one hand and powerful PPG leaderships on the other, by contrast, are found to be more consequential for the substantive representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups.
Institutional Context and the Substantive Representation of Disadvantaged Immigrant Groups
A major controversy in political science is the question of whether MPs should be conceptualised as trustees, who act based on their own conscience, or as delegates, who act based on the instructions of others (Converse and Pierce 1986; Pitkin 1967) . Conceptualising
MPs as trustees means in large parts to assume that MPs' intrinsic motivations underlie their legislative behaviour. This is basically what normative arguments in the 'politics of presence' school of thought are based on. In order to represent the interests of disadvantaged groups, representatives need to have a thorough understanding of and similar life experiences to the represented, which can be best achieved by descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995: 159) . Previous empirical research in this line of thought (e.g. Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014a ) is thus widely based on the assumption that MPs' legislative behaviour hinges on their intrinsic motivations, that is, on the trustee notion of substantive representation.
Conceptualising MPs as delegates, however, makes us aware that substantive representation may also be based on demands external to MPs' conscience and personal experiences. In this view, MPs act as agents of principals who control access to certain goods that MPs value (Carey 2009; Mitchell 2000; Müller 2000) . The assumption is that MPs are driven by their ambition to reach certain career-related goals, ordered in the following way. First of all, MPs need to achieve reselection as a necessary precondition for their second goal, reelection, which in turn is a necessary condition for the achievement of their third goal, access to positions of influence within parliament, such as committee membership and chairs or frontbench membership (Strøm 1997) . The achievement of the first goal, reselection, is in most parliamentary democracies controlled by parties' nomination conventions (Müller 2000) . The second goal, reelection, can only be achieved, if enough voters support the candidate or the party list bearing him/her (Mitchell 2000) . The third goal, positions of legislative influence, is in most cases under control of the leadership of the PPG (Carey 2009 ). Thus, MPs typically find themselves in the difficult situation of having to please the demands of (at times) three different principals: voters, party selectorates and PPG leaders.
In the view of principal-agent theory, MPs' acting on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant groups can be therefore understood as being part of a strategy supposed to please the demands of one or several principals. The extent to which the demands of one principal outweigh the demands of another one, however, depends on the relative value of the resources controlled by each principal, which is determined by the rules of the game, that is, their institutional environment (cf. Carey 2009: 14) . Among the most important institutional variables are electoral rules, candidate selection methods and the internal organisation of parliaments.
Electoral rules, to begin with, are commonly thought to determine the relative weight of local voter groups for MPs' reelection prospects relative to the weight of the party branch controlling the candidate selection process. Under closed-list PR elections, voters have little leverage to change the electoral fate of individual candidates, given they are confronted with fixed and often long lists of candidates, which voters can only take or defect as a whole (Carey and Shugart 1995; Mitchell 2000; Shugart et al. 2005) . The list position allocated in the selection process will thus determine MPs' future electoral prospects, such that MPs should have strong incentives to follow the demands of a party selectorate (Carey 2009 (Carey and Shugart 1995; Mitchell 2000) . Therefore,
MPs should see more reasons to provide substantive representation in response to local concentrations of immigrant-origin citizens when elected in single-member districts.
Conversely, the demands of national party bodies should weigh stronger on MPs' shoulders with regard to the representation of immigrants' interests under closed-list PR rules.
The candidate selection method is another factor that may affect the relationship between MPs and their principals. As already mentioned, reselection is a necessary precondition for all other career-related goals, such that MPs can be assumed to owe part of their loyalty to the gatekeepers in the candidate-selection process (Müller 2000) . In this respect, the degree of territorial decentralisation is an important dimension of candidate selection (Rahat and Hazan 2001) . Arguably, local party organisations should attach greater weight to the local visibility of their parliamentary representatives while national party headquarters should value MPs' efforts to cultivate a national party reputation (Gallagher 1988: 15; Karlsen and Narud 2013 Legislative organisation is a third institutional feature that is particularly consequential for the principal-agent relationship between PPG leaderships and individual MPs. Strøm (1998) , distinguishes a vertical and a horizontal dimension of legislative organisation. Vertically, the building blocks of parliaments are hierarchically organised PPGs (Saalfeld and Strøm 2014) .
At the top of this hierarchy, PPG leaderships seek to further the collective goals of the national party in terms of policy, offices and votes (Strøm and Müller 1999) . To achieve these goals, however, PPG leaders depend on the collective effort of the entire party group (Müller 2000) , although individual MPs sometimes face deviating cross-pressure from competing principals (Carey 2009 ). In order to incentivise MPs to work towards the collective goals of the party despite competing demands, PPG leaders often have a number of disciplinary instruments at their disposal: patronage and control of MPs' promotion to influential legislative or execute office, assignment to or withdrawal from certain committees, access to the parliamentary floor/ rapporteurship, access to the media, and benefits such as business trips, office space, staff and a variety of other perks (Bailer 2017; Bowler et al. 1999; Carey 2009; Sieberer 2006; Strøm 1997) . Some of these resources can strongly affect MPs' individual vote-seeking and policy goals. For example, appointment to a leadership position in the PPG can enhance MPs' policy influence, while access to the parliamentary floor in a well-publicised debate provides a public platform to enhance the MP's status among constituents or the local party base.
Disciplinary measures are commonly considered important instruments for the purpose of accomplishing party unity when bills are voted on in the plenary, thus ensuring the collective decision-making ability of the parliament (Bailer 2017; Bowler et al. 1999; Sieberer 2006 ).
However, focusing solely on legislative voting in the plenary would neglect the horizontal dimension of legislative organisation, that is, the role of specialised committees. Committees play a crucial role in most parliaments as they constitute the arena in which bills are considered and amended before being mainly 'waved through' in the plenary (Cox and McCubbins 2007: 9-12) . Indeed, the scarcity of time and the fact that law-making necessitates a sophisticated level of policy-specific expertise on the part of MPs makes committee specialisation a necessary and important feature of parliamentary politics (Strøm 1998: 24-27) .
Therefore, by necessity, PPG leaders have to consider that policy-making takes place in various policy jurisdictions. Plausibly, the need for an efficient division of labour is intimately connected with the principal-agent relationship between PPG leaderships and their MPs. In that sense, committees can be understood as an extension of legislative party power (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Miller and Stecker 2008; Strøm 1998 (Damgaard 1995) . Based on these considerations, it is thus plausible to assume that the extent to which MPs' committee assignments shape their legislative behaviour reflects the extent to which they serve their PPG leaderships as policy-specialised agents. Therefore, MPs should have incentives to further the interests of disadvantaged immigrant groups if this is a policy goal of their PPG leaderships in the policy jurisdiction of their committees.
Parliamentary Questions and the Substantive Representation of Disadvantaged Immigrant Groups in the German Bundestag
To examine this theoretical framework, we focus our study on Germany for two main reasons.
First, Germany is a very relevant case to the study of immigrants' substantive representation.
Germany accounts Second, Germany's institutional environment offers the opportunity to analyse and contrast the effects of institutional variables on the relationship between MPs and their principals.
German MPs find themselves in a complex institutional environment combining mixed electoral rules with a localised candidate selection procedure and tightly organised PPGs. This environment provides researchers the opportunity to better disentangle the effects of these factors while holding constant influences of country-specific context (e.g. Moser and Scheiner 2012: 46) . Indeed, it remains a matter of controversy whether electoral rules trump the effects of candidate selection methods and legislative organisation, or vice versa. Shugart and coauthors (2005: 441) argue, for example, that parties and MPs alike respond mainly to voters' informational demands encoded in the electoral system, and not, for example, to partyrelated candidate selection procedures. However, others have argued that centralised candidate selection methods and powerful PPG leaders weaken MPs constituency relations despite strong personal vote-seeking incentives encoded in electoral rules (Martin 2014; Preece 2014) . In this article, we take these opposing views as empirical questions, leveraging
Germany as an institutional environment in which principals 'pull' their MPs into different directions.
To pursue these empirical questions, we follow previous research and draw on parliamentary questions ( arguing that behavioural differences between the two types of MPs blur due to other institutional influences affecting MPs' behaviour in similar ways across electoral tiers (e.g. Crisp 2007; Ferrara et al. 2005; Manow 2013 ).
In the German case, such arguments often highlight how candidates are selected to run for the Bundestag (Manow 2013) . Formally, the electoral law stipulates that candidates in the SMD tier must be selected in local constituencies while candidates in the PR tier must be selected at nomination conferences at the upper regional level (Detterbeck 2016) . However, the electoral law permits candidates to run as 'dual candidates', that is, in both electoral tiers simultaneously 1 . In fact, dual candidacy is common, because voters reward parties electorally for the local presence of candidates (Ferrara et al. 2005; Hainmueller and Kern 2008) .
Therefore, parties have vote-seeking incentives to require that their candidates are selected in the SMD tier before being allowed access to promising party list positions in the PR tier (Detterbeck 2016; Manow 2013: 289) . In other words, as local re-selection is a precondition for realistic list positions in the PR tier, local reselection is de-facto a requirement for MPs' reelection in both electoral tiers. Therefore, SMD and PR MPs alike may have incentives to represent local constituencies in their PQs.
In line with Crisp, we argue that the finding of behavioural homogeneity across electoral tiers can be taken as evidence that the incentives institutionalized in the electoral tiers are being trumped by the candidate selection process (Crisp 2007 (Crisp : 1462 . In other words, if the locus of candidate selection were the driving force behind German MPs' responsiveness to the demands of local immigrant-origin citizens and not their election in single-member districts, then MPs should respond to the share of immigrant-origin citizens in the constituency where they were locally selected. Thus, our first hypothesis reads:
MPs are more responsive to immigrant-origin citizens' interests the more immigrant-origin voters reside in their local constituencies, regardless of their election mode (H1).
The second major question is whether MPs' responsiveness to the demands of their PPG leaderships to speak on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant groups is mainly influenced by electoral rules or by the internal organisation of the parliament. In terms of legislative organisation, the Bundestag could be described as a party-controlled Arbeitsparlament ('working parliament') based on the division of labour in policy-specialised committees mirroring the government structure (Ismayr 2012: 162; Miller and Stecker 2008) . PPG leaderships maintain strong control over their MPs' committee work, as they have the prerogative of assigning MPs to, and withdrawing them from committees (Damgaard 1995; Miller and Stecker 2008) . The strong role of parties is also reflected in the fact that committees work behind closed doors, therefore only visible to the PPG leadership as a principal. Party control is further ensured by weekly meetings of the PPGs' working groups, which mirror the committee structure and prepare the parties' positions in the committee (Miller and Stecker 2008) . If MPs refuse to work in line with the policy goals of the party, the PPG leadership can apply several sanctions. These range from subtle pressure, to the dissenting MP's withdrawal from the committee, or the ultimate denial of promotion within the hierarchy of the PPG (Damgaard 1995; Ismayr 1992: 169) .
While it remains relatively undisputed that PQs can serve MPs for the purpose of cultivating local voter support (Fernandes et al. 2018; Martin 2011a; Russo 2011; Saalfeld 2011 
Data and Methods

Measuring Substantive Representation in Parliamentary Questions
To test the hypotheses laid out in the previous section, we compiled all 20,130 PQs tabled by individual MPs in the 17 th German Bundestag. In order to identify PQs tabled on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant groups, we focus on the representation of their objective interests rather than on the representation of their subjective interests (for a detailed discussion see Swain 1993: 6) . That is, PQs are understood to be substantively representative if they raise attention to immigrants' unequal living conditions, for example in terms of level of income, physical well-being or employment status, and/or demand the integration of immigrant-origin residents into German society. Integration refers here, according to Alba and Foner (2015: 5) , to processes that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants in major institutions such as the educational and political system and the labour and housing market. In order to identify PQs tabled on behalf of disadvantaged immigrant groups, herein called integration-related PQs, we combine human and dictionary-based machine coding. A detailed description of the text coding procedure and its validation, the final list of key words, as well as two examples of such questions are provided in the appendices A1 and A2 to this paper.
Based on this coding, the final measure of our dependent variables is the count of integrationrelated PQs per MP.
Independent and Control Variables
We measure the magnitude of the local demand of immigrant-origin citizens as the share of foreign nationals in the local district 2 and connect this information to all MPs who were running in the election as SMD tier candidates. Thus, all dually nominated MPs are linked to the constituencies in which they were selected to run as SMD tier candidates. PR tier legislators who did not run as a candidate in a district race (2.3% of all legislators) were excluded from the analysis. Of course, using the percentage of foreign nationals as a proxy for the immigrant-origin electorate at the constituency-level is not ideal. Nevertheless, it is the only immigrant-related indicator available at the constituency-level, and given it is highly correlated (r=0.78) with the group of naturalised residents of immigrant-origin at the level of differently drawn administrative districts (Wüst 2014b) 
Statistical Model
The empirical modelling strategy must take into account two related methodological aspects.
First, as our unit of analysis is the MP and the dependent variable captures counts of integration-related questions asked per MP, negative-binomial regression models are an appropriate choice. 4 Second, the share of zeros in our dependent variable amounts to 82.7%.
Zeros may be generated according to two different mechanisms. First, an MP decides not to ask a single integration-related PQ. Second, an MP decides not to ask any PQs at all. The latter mechanism is strongly related to the tendency of MPs representing government parties to ask no or only few PQs, while MPs of opposition parties typically ask a lot more PQs.
Obviously, a major precondition to the tabling of integration-related questions is that an MP asks PQs at all. In our dataset 399 out of 637 MPs asked at least one PQ, and 110 MPs asked at least one integration-related question. SPD, Greens) are more likely to table more PQs overall. This is especially problematic since in the legislative term under study the division between opposition and government is clearcut with regard to the left/ right divide. In order to better disentangle party and opposition effects and better handle the zero-inflation in our dependant variable we fit zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. These models are mixture models that combine two regression equations: a logit model to explain the zero inflation, and a negative binomial model to explain non-zero counts in the dependant variable (Cameron and Trivedi 2013: 111-76) . In order to explain MPs' propensity of asking at least one integration-related PQ, we include the total number of PQs asked by each MP in the inflation equation 6 . Doing so allows 20 us to control for factors that make MPs ask few or no PQs at all, as outlined in the previous section, in the explanations of zero-observations.
Results
In Table 2 we present the results of four estimated zero-inflated regression models. The models estimate the effects of the independent and control variables on the number of integration-related PQs in the count regression equation. Model 1 includes all independent variables without interactions, indicating that MPs ask more integration-related PQs the more immigrants reside in their constituencies, the higher the integration-relatedness of their parties' manifestos and if they sit on migration-related committees.
Model 2 extends the regression model by the interaction between the local share of foreign nationals and the distinction between MPs' election modes to test whether the constituency effect works regardless of the electoral tier (H1). Here, the coefficient for the share of foreign nationals, which stands for the constituency effect of list MPs, is positive and statistically significant at p < 0.1. By contrast, neither the coefficient of the SMD tier, which stands for the average difference between list and SMD MPs, nor the coefficient of the interaction term, which stands for the difference of the constituency effect for SMD MPs relative to list MPs, reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. In model 4 we intend to test whether the party focus in MPs' integration-related PQs further depends on their election in the PR tier (H2c). For this purpose, we create a three-way interaction between SMD MP, migration-related committee and their affiliation with a leftwing as opposed to a right-wing party 7 . Since this regression table is an unwieldy format to assess the model coefficients, we direct the reader to the visualisation of the predicted counts of integration-related PQs, shown in the right panel of Figure 3 . In this visualisation, the left/right PPG distinction is held at 'left-wing', while MPs committee assignments and election modes vary. As can be seen, the effect of the committee assignment does not vary greatly between MPs' elected in the PR and SMD tier and the confidence intervals are widely overlapping. Therefore, H2c cannot be falsified based on this empirical evidence.
Furthermore, in all four models it is found that MPs of immigrant-origin are more likely to ask integration-related questions, corroborating findings from previous studies. However, the empirical evidence indicates that descriptive representation is only part of the story of immigrants' substantive representation.
Three major findings can be summarised from this analysis. First, MPs tend to ask more integration-related PQs the more foreign nationals reside in local constituencies where they were selected to run as district candidates. Second, they ask more of such questions when they sit on committees more likely to deal with matters of immigrants' integration as representatives of parties that make a commitment to improving the living conditions of disadvantaged immigrant groups in their manifestos. Third, these relationships seem to exist irrespective of MPs' own national backgrounds and regardless of whether they were elected under SMD or PR electoral rules in Germany's mixed-member system.
Our results are robust to different modelling strategies, which are presented in the online appendix A4.
Concluding remarks
Western representative democracies face new challenges due to the pressures of large-scale immigration creating multi-ethnic societies (Bird et al. 2011) . Drawing on principal-agent models of democratic representation, this paper examines how institutional factors shape
MPs' responsiveness to the disadvantages that immigrants and their descendants face in German society. Arguing that the role of native MPs has been underappreciated in previous research, we conceptualise MPs irrespective of their own national backgrounds as delegates who act based on the instructions of their most important principals: local constituents, party selectorates and PPGs. This analytical perspective constitutes a contrast to the 'politics of presence' approach, which sees MPs rather as trustees whose conscience and personal experiences determine their legislative behaviour (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995) .
However, we do not seek to contradict previous work based on the trustee conception. Rather, we argue that in order to improve our knowledge of the political representation of disadvantaged immigrant groups, it is fruitful to investigate relevant phenomena through a variety of analytical perspectives. In this regard, our study of the German case is a first step. Comparative research would be a valuable extension to the present study in order to deepen our understanding of the consequences of candidate selection and legislative organisation for substantive representation across different electoral system regimes. Moreover, future research may also include other characteristics of MPs' institutional environments. For example, in many party-centred electoral systems national MPs pursue local political careers simultaneously (Fernandes et al. 2018; Russo 2011) or are subject to powerful local party branches in other ways (Tavits 2011) . These factors can have the effect that MPs remain responsive to the demands of local concentrations of immigrant-origin citizens despite party-centred electoral rules. Given its parsimony, principal-agent theory should be a useful tool to explore the consequences of these factors in other parliamentary democracies, as well. In this light, the present contribution should be understood as a point of departure for future studies interested in the political representation of immigrants and their descendants in Western democracies.
Notes
1 If dual candidates are entitled to seats in both electoral tiers, they are automatically considered elected in the SMD tier and the PR tier seat will be allocated to the next candidate on the list. Due to the seat compensation mechanism between electoral tiers, parties' seat shares are not affected by these rules.
2 All data used in this article, including the raw text of parliamentary questions, have been collected in the context of the PATHWAYS project (www.pathways.eu).
3 Immigrant-related committees are labour and social affairs; education and research; family, elderly and women; domestic affairs; culture and media; human rights; economic development; petitions;
and the investigation committee on the fascist terror of the 'Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund'
(NSU). 4 We chose a negative binomial model as diagnostics for a poisson model indicated overdispersion.
Vuong tests further provided strong support for the use of zero-inflated mixture models.
5 All figures shown in this paper were generated using the Stata scheme plotplain (Bischof 2017) . 6 We tested other specifications of the zero -inflation equation, including other variables used in the count equation. However, since these variables did not turn out to be significant and further increased the complexity of the models without improving their explanatory power indicated by a growing BIC value (Bayesian Information Criterion), we decided against their inclusion.
7 Because MPs' election modes are strongly dependent on their party affiliation (almost all SMD MPs are either CDU/CSU or SPD), we would run into collinearity issues if we used the manifesto variable or party dummies in the interaction. Thus, we rely here on the rather simplistic left-right distinction.
However, we would argue that it is reasonable to use this rather crude measure in interaction with the committee variable to capture PPGs' demands, because as Model 3 and the left-hand plot of The texts of German PQs were extracted from official online archives of the Bundestag using Python programming scripts. All files were available as PDF documents and were converted to raw text. Subsequently, several string matching procedures were used to isolate questions and subsequently match them with MP-level information.
The measurement goal is to identify PQs that raise attention to and demand the improvement of the living conditions of immigrants and their descendants. It is important to note that we do not intend to capture sceptical positions on the integration of immigrant-origin residents, i.e.
content that relates to the protection of German national identity or expresses reservations against the integration of immigrants and multicultural society. In other words, our measure should not be mistaken as a measure of saliency or positioning on a pro-vs. anti-immigrant continuum. Ideally, in order to identify integration-related PQs, every single question in our corpus would be inspected qualitatively to determine whether it addresses immigrants' disadvantages in German society or not. As this is not feasible for over 20,000 questions we combine human and machine coding to identify integration-related PQs. The procedure involved four steps.
In a first step we pre-defined a list of terms which have been manually extracted from the minutes of a parliamentary debate in which integration-related issues were discussed
7
. We also added other terms that we gathered from comprehensive qualitative inspections of the PQs. We then used this list of terms to filter the corpus. If, for example, a PQ includes the term "Migrationshintergrund" (German for "migratory background") or any other term in the list, this PQ would remain in our filtered corpus. A PQ without any terms on the list would be excluded from the corpus.
In a second step, we combined this filtered corpus with a random sample of remaining, nonfiltered PQs. Two hand coders were familiarised with our definition of substantive representation and then were asked to classify each question as either integration-related or not 7
. The intercoder-reliability in form of Cohen's Kappa (Cohen 1960 ) between human coders was 0.79. All coding disagreements were discussed and recoded after consensus accordingly. Additionally, from each validated question, our hand-coders again collected specific key terms which indicate that the question is integration-related. We updated the key term list accordingly.
In a third step we used the hand-coded corpus to test our updated key term list for the identification of integration-related PQs. By using the updated list of key terms
, 82% of all questions in our validated corpus were classified correctly
. In a fourth step we applied our updated key term list to all 20,130 PQs, identifying a total of 869 potentially integrationrelated questions in the whole corpus.
One concern with key term-based textual analyses is its susceptibility to falsely capturing irrelevant documents (false positives), while at the same time failing to capture relevant documents (false negatives). In order to keep such bias at a minimum, we inspected in a final step all 869 positives qualitatively in order to discard false positives, which left us with a total of 544 PQs as a final measure of integration-related PQs. This amounts to 2.7% of all PQs in our corpus.
Concerns regarding false negatives cannot be quantified to the same extent, but we are confident that this does not pose too great a problem to our measurement, given that we have included a random subset of the unfiltered corpus in our validation approach in step 2.
Nevertheless, to be fair, we cannot completely rule out that the captured number of integration-related PQs constitutes an underestimation of the real number of integrationrelated PQs in the analysed text corpus.
positive) and per608 (multiculturalism: negative). However, in addition to these items and in difference to the cited literature, we also add positive values for the item per503 (Equality: positive). Including the equality item per503 takes into account that policy agendas with a focus on redistribution, equal opportunities and racial equality, tend to intersect "with the material and subjective aspirations of immigrant voters who generally find themselves socioeconomically disadvantaged or the objects of racial prejudice or social exclusion" (Messina 2007: 208) . Thus, by including this item in the index, our measure comes closer to the running definition of immigrant-origin citizens' integration (see page 16 in the main article). Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we re-estimated the first three models of Table 2 shown in the main article using a more parsimonious index that excludes per503. As can be seen in the section on the robustness checks (robustness check 3 in this appendix file), results do not change considerably when per503 is considered or not. Based on our operationalisation, the five parties achieve the following scores The Left 24.910
A4: Robustness Checks
As robustness checks, we refitted the models as standard negative binomial regression models on the whole sample of MPs (Robustness check 1) and on a reduced sample of MPs who have asked at least one PQ (Robustness check 2). Robustness check 3 replicates Models 1-3 from the main article using the same party manifesto coding as Wüst (2016) 
